Honestly have no idea what you’re trying to say here … the point of governmental power and law is arguably not to be optional.
If the Supreme Court has the final and unreviewable power to decides what the law means, and their proclamations are simply followed without question by the Executive, then they’re not optional in any way and they have ultimate power under our system of rules. Congress can make new rules that the Supreme Court can declare unconstitutional or twist to their viewpoints, the executive can take action that is then declared unconstitutional.
The only Constitutional restriction on them is impeachment and removal, but they’re the people who decide how the Constitution works. And impeachment is basically an irrelevant fantasy. The actual check is what’s not given to them. All they can do is publish words, which are supposed to be followed but which they don’t have any actual power or money to force into being without cooperation. But if your not willing to consider that an executive might at some time be right in saying “no”, then they are effectively all powerful.
That’s the “optional” part. Requiring some dupe to bring a case is trivial, it doesn’t make them optional, it’s that their power can be vetoed by simply being ignored. And it’s a power that needs to be held over them the further they stray into being an entirely political body.
The only Constitutional restriction on them is impeachment and removal,
… and constitutional amendment … a democratic process
But if your not willing to consider that an executive might at some time be right in saying “no”, then they are effectively all powerful.
That’s the “optional” part.
Then would the country have any option to being subject to the Executive’s power to override the court? You sidestepped my most important question … what kind of governmental power is ever “optional”? And I suspect that’s because you haven’t thought through what happens when you override one branch’s power with another’s.
Moreover, in highlighting how easy it is to ignore the court, you’re strangely acknowledging my “least worrisome” point but then folding that into an argument that they should therefore be ignored by the executive … because “they can” or “they might be right”. Which only highlights the danger of this line of thought … if one reads between the lines, it’d be fair to conclude that you favour the more powerful parts of government flexing their muscles. The danger being that there’s no outline here of what happens next and whether there are then more or fewer “options” for the country. If the executive can just say “nah” … what law is there? What constrains the government from its natural vice of abusing power, compared to a court that can only say somethings are not permitted?
Otherwise, if a politicised court is a concern (which I generally agree with and probably like you feel should be taken more seriously to the point that formally I actually endorse your arguments, just not substantively) … I think there are various other things that can be done without throwing the baby out with the bath water. Unfortunately, I’d fear that the politicisation of the court, to the point that controlling it’s makeup seems like half of the point in a presidential election, and the constitution (or its “hot topics”) has gone too far for any side to be willing to “let go of the rope”.
If the Supreme Court has the final and unreviewable power to decides what the law means, and their proclamations are simply followed without question by the Executive, then they’re not optional in any way and they have ultimate power under our system of rules. Congress can make new rules that the Supreme Court can declare unconstitutional or twist to their viewpoints, the executive can take action that is then declared unconstitutional.
The only Constitutional restriction on them is impeachment and removal, but they’re the people who decide how the Constitution works. And impeachment is basically an irrelevant fantasy. The actual check is what’s not given to them. All they can do is publish words, which are supposed to be followed but which they don’t have any actual power or money to force into being without cooperation. But if your not willing to consider that an executive might at some time be right in saying “no”, then they are effectively all powerful.
That’s the “optional” part. Requiring some dupe to bring a case is trivial, it doesn’t make them optional, it’s that their power can be vetoed by simply being ignored. And it’s a power that needs to be held over them the further they stray into being an entirely political body.
… and constitutional amendment … a democratic process
Then would the country have any option to being subject to the Executive’s power to override the court? You sidestepped my most important question … what kind of governmental power is ever “optional”? And I suspect that’s because you haven’t thought through what happens when you override one branch’s power with another’s.
Moreover, in highlighting how easy it is to ignore the court, you’re strangely acknowledging my “least worrisome” point but then folding that into an argument that they should therefore be ignored by the executive … because “they can” or “they might be right”. Which only highlights the danger of this line of thought … if one reads between the lines, it’d be fair to conclude that you favour the more powerful parts of government flexing their muscles. The danger being that there’s no outline here of what happens next and whether there are then more or fewer “options” for the country. If the executive can just say “nah” … what law is there? What constrains the government from its natural vice of abusing power, compared to a court that can only say somethings are not permitted?
Otherwise, if a politicised court is a concern (which I generally agree with and probably like you feel should be taken more seriously to the point that formally I actually endorse your arguments, just not substantively) … I think there are various other things that can be done without throwing the baby out with the bath water. Unfortunately, I’d fear that the politicisation of the court, to the point that controlling it’s makeup seems like half of the point in a presidential election, and the constitution (or its “hot topics”) has gone too far for any side to be willing to “let go of the rope”.