Just a random thought experiment. Let’s say I have my account on a lemmy instance: userA@mylemmy.com. One day I decide to stop paying for the domain and move to userA@mynewlemmy.com, and someone else gains it and also starts up a lemmy instance.
If they make their own userA@mylemmy.com, how do federated instances distinguish who’s who?
Have I misunderstood the role of domain names in this?
I’ve only read the ActivityPub spec; I haven’t read the Lemmy code.
With that in mind, my impression is —
The new domain owner — if they set up an ActivityPub server instance (e.g. a Lemmy) and got a list of the old user’s post URLs — might be able to delete or edit the old user’s posts stored on other instances. That is a vulnerability, albeit a small one.
If the old user was still listed as a moderator of communities hosted on other instances, the new domain owner might be able to take over that moderator role.
One way to fix this would be for instances to issue a public-key cryptographic identity to each user, and distribute users’ public keys to other instances. Then activities purporting to be from that user would need to be signed by that user’s private key.
Users’ private keys would stay local to their home instance, so users don’t have to do any key management themselves.
This would mean that if an instance goes away (and its key material is destroyed) then nobody can ever act as any of those users again. A new user created with the same username and domain would be a distinct user for all other instances too.
“Small one” is very wrong here. This is by far the largest gaping security hole in the whole specification.
Since when is stealing a domain name easy? If it would be then google.com would redirect to another scam site every five minutes.
The only way you’re going to steal a domain is if the owner stops paying for it.
If you steal gmail.com you could impersonate anyone with a gmail email address. How is that an argument?
You would be surprised: https://money.cnn.com/2016/01/29/technology/google-domain-purchase/index.html
But you are right about email, it is about the same.
But with time we could be more careful in federation to keep track of domains expiration dates and owners.
Maybe just instances need to be verified with public/private keys and not all accounts on them.
It absolutely makes sense to secure content and especially moderator positions in other communities by public/private keys.
But look at my replies to /u/Dirk below. If someone actually takes over a domain, sets up a new Lemmy instance and creates the same user again (but without matching keys), how should other instances treat that user? Like a new one? Or block all federation? Do you get warnings interacting with that user (as they could just write another community moderator to invite them “again”)?
All valid arguments, code needs to be checked abou what is possible to implement. Even if we start with one way of dealing with those instances, it will be possible to chamge in the future.
Thank you for good discussion in this thread.
You either social engineer the needed data or hack the domain owner and change the Admin-C or Tech-C and then either directly or by request change the IP for that domain. You could also bribe some one working there or someone who works for the registrar or somehow gain access to the mail account of Admin-C or Tech-C.
https://www.hackingloops.com/domain-hijacking-how-to-hijack-domain-names/
You could also try to poison the instance’s DNS cache so the domain in question is resolved to an IP where the server is under your control.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking
You could also register domain names that are either unpaid for whatever reason and thus marked as in transit and if the transit period is over you just claim the address.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_drop_catching
And since you mentioned google.com:
https://money.cnn.com/2016/01/29/technology/google-domain-purchase/index.html
To recite @fubo@lemmy.world: Depending on DNS for security is generally a bad idea.
Sure, but if you lose your domain you already lost. That’s it, game over.
I do agree it would make sense to issue every Lemmy instance and every user an asymmetric key pair they can sign against, just for extra security. But that might also break things because instances per domain are no longer unique. You can have lemmy.ml@publickey1 and then lemmy.ml@publickey2 and then lemmy.ml@publickey3 and so on. It would be an absolute mess.
This doesn’t even have to be an attack. A new instance owner might decide to re-setup their instance and nuke everything or they simply lost the data. Or on a faulty Lemmy update things break and the private key gets regenerated or jumbled up. Especially right now in the early stages of this platform where things are bound to go wrong you don’t want to accidentally nuke an entire instance.
What do you do then if a legitimate owner sets up the instance under the same domain again?
Besides that, if an instance really gets removed (which basically happens if someone takes over the domain, they don’t have access to the instance data itself) other instances can simply defederate in an emergency. Though the only damage would be moderator accounts on other instances. The content is dead the moment the instance dies anyway (there just isn’t a mechanism yet to clean it up if there is no delete events being sent, but that will probably come).
The key should OF COURSE not be a part of the URL. It should also not be instance specific or specific to a certain federated server. It should be in the protocol itself. A field in the
Actorobject where a public key can be placed and then whenever an action is done, it gets signed. The private key stays with the user.All of your other considerations would automatically become non-issues, since the key pair stays with the user and not on the instance. As long as the public key field is intact it can be verified that the action was performed by a specific actor. And if not, it can be seen as unverified.
You could also bind administrative activities to key-based authentication.
This was an example, not an identifier.
lemmy.ml is the domain. And the instance on that domain has a private and a public key.
If you nuke your first instance and recreate it the keys will be different, which means you suddenly have two different instances for lemmy.ml when the new instance starts to federate. Which basically is lemmy.ml-1, lemmy.ml-2, …
So what should other servers do? Only accept the first public key they ever saw for a domain as an instance? Then block new instances from the same domain? Or is there a way to differentiate the instances? Or do you nuke all content of an old instance when a new one pops up with a different public key?
If someone creates a second instance for the same domain all hell breaks loose either way. Because the new instance can have myuser@lemmy.ml that already existed with the old public key. Should federation just crash at that point? Throw an error? Block this user because it existed in the past? Treat it as a new user, but with the same name (which would be horrible UI wise)?
I still don’t get what you complain about.
In an alternative timeline the keys are in no way related to any instance or domain or whatever. Not even to identically named
Personobjects on a recreated instance. AllActivityobjects are signed with a specific key. TheActoris also signed with the specific key. The private key is not stored anywhere except on the machine the user using the actor from.All activities performed by an actor and the actor are signed. If you copy over the activities to another instance the sign is still valid. If you rename the instance it is still valid. If you modify the action or the actor it becomes invalid. (Somewhat similar to how mail signing works.)
If you reuse a hacked/stolen/whatever actor, all actions you perform with this actor are unverified because the person misusing the actor cannot sign the actions. If you change the public key stored in the
Actorobject all previous actions cannot be verified to be done by the actor. This could be solved to make the public key store in the Actor a list. So you can add multiple keys with validity start and end date (all signed with the next key).You still don’t seem to grasp the issue I’m pointing to.
You have instance 1, lemmy.whatever, this instance federated content to lemmy.ml. So now lemmy.ml holds content from lemmy.whatever.
Instance 1 gets nuked. Either because someone stole the domain, or the admin simply lost the private keys and had no backup. Or they had a backup but it’s old and half their users got lost. A new Lemmy instance gets set up on lemmy.whatever (with a new key obviously). This is Instance 2.
Now lemmy.whatever starts federating content to lemmy.ml, but from instance 2.
How do you differentiate content and users from instance 1 and instance 2? It’s the same domain, but different instances as the keys don’t match. Do you block instance 2? Do you delete everything from instance 1 and now instance 2 is the “true” instance for the domain lemmy.whatever? Do you mark all new content from instance 2 as “unverified”?
Sure, with private keys in place a user test@lemmy.whatever from instance 2 can’t modify content from the instance 1 user test@lemmy.whatever. But the instance 2 user could create new content under the name of the old user. How is this federated? Do other instances show the guy as test(2)@lemmy.whatever because the keys don’t match?
Maybe it would be enough for instances to have their keys and to be securely identifiable, and not all user accounts?