Last year, I outlined the specific requirements that an app needs to have in order for me to consider it a Signal competitor.

Afterwards, I had several people ask me what I think of a Signal fork called Session. My answer then is the same thing I’ll say today:

Don’t use Session.

  • peregus@lemmy.world
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    6 hours ago

    It would be nice to read the basic points of your statement, then if someone wants to go in detail, there’s the link to your article.

      • peregus@lemmy.world
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        2 hours ago

        Ops. However a small TL;DR would be useful instead of just copying/pasting links.

        • Soatok Dreamseeker
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          1 hour ago

          TL;DR from oss-security:

          At a glance, what I found is the following:

          1. Session only uses 128 bits of entropy for Ed25519 keys. This means their ECDLP is at most 64 bits, which is pretty reasonably in the realm of possibility for nation state attackers to exploit.
          2. Session has an Ed25519 verification algorithm that verifies a signature for a message against a public key provided by the message. This is amateur hour.
          3. Session uses an X25519 public key as the symmetric key for AES-GCM as part of their encryption for onion routing.

          Additional gripes about their source code were also included in the blog post.