- cross-posted to:
- europe@feddit.de
- politiikka@sopuli.xyz
- cross-posted to:
- europe@feddit.de
- politiikka@sopuli.xyz
New legislative articles, introduced in recent closed-door meetings and not yet public, envision that all web browsers distributed in Europe will be required to trust the certificate authorities and cryptographic keys selected by EU governments.
The near-final text of the eIDAS (electronic identification, authentication, and trust services) will be presented to the public and parliament for a rubber stamp before the end of the year.
It enables the government of any EU member state to issue website certificates for interception and surveillance which can be used against every EU citizen, even those not resident in or connected to the issuing member state. There is no independent check or balance on the decisions made by member states with respect to the keys they authorize and the use they put them to.
This is particularly troubling given that adherence to the rule of law has not been uniform across all member states, with documented instances of coercion by secret police for political purposes.
They should include a system to independently check these approved/recommended certificate issuers.
But the calls to revert the whole process come from US companies who have their own interests.
First of, this is not a call to revert the process but to adhere to what was publicly announced, and not some last-minute backroom deal for authoritarian control. Second, those companies are mostly European, in addition to the hundreds of European cybersecurity experts who are signatories. Third, your solution is horrible.